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THE HOBBS ACT THROUGH THE
RIVERA-RIVERA LOOKING GLASS: A MERE
INSTRUSION UPON BASIC FUNDAMENTAL
FEDERALISM PRINCIPLES?
PATRICK GOODWIN*

I. INTRODUCTION
"The Powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
federal government are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite."'
By and large, the United States federal government has
abided by this fundamental principle that James Madison
delivered during the Constitution's ratification process. 2 However,
pursuant to its Commerce Clause power,3 Congress's ability to
regulate activities that may affect interstate commerce has grown
substantially. 4
Congress has passed several laws making it a federal offense
to engage in conduct that interferes with interstate commerce,5
* The John Marshall Law School, 2011. The author would like to thank his
parents, Peter and Kathi Goodwin, for all of their encouragement and support.
1. JAMES MADISON, NO. 45: THE ALLEGED DANGER FROM THE POWERS OF
THE UNION TO THE STATE GOVERNMENTS CONSIDERED (1788), reprinted in
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, 285-290, at 289 (Clinton Rossiter ed., Penguin
Group 1961).

2. James Madison's Address to New York Citizens (The Federalist No. 45),
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa45.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2011).
3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power to regulate
commerce with foreign Nations, among the States, and with the Indian
Tribes).
4. See United States Dep't of the Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 499
(1993) (explaining that the evolution of an interdependent and interconnected
national economy has created the need for a more expansive jurisprudential
view of what interstate commerce entails); see also United States v. Culbert,
435 U.S. 371, 373, 379 (1978) (noting that Congress anticipated that the
Hobbs Act legislation would authorize them to use full constitutional power to
punish interferences with interstate commerce because states had been
ineffective in prosecuting robberies and extortions that had affected interstate
commerce in the past).
5. Interstate commerce has been narrowed in recent years to only
encompass regulation of channels, instrumentalities, and activities that have
a substantial relation upon business that occurs between the states. ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

§

3.3.5, 265-

66 (3d ed. 2006). Additionally, intrastate activities that "so affect intrastate
commerce" in the aggregate also fit into Congress's commerce powers. Wickard
237
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usurping police powers traditionally reserved for the states. 6 One
such law is the Hobbs Act, which allows Congress to punish
interference with interstate commerce when the crimes are
robbery, extortion, or involve physical violence. 7
In response, the courts have determined that if an activity
reasonably affects interstate commerce, 8 either on its own or
through aggregation, Congress has the power to punish those
offenders under federal law.9 In the case of United States v.

Rivera-Rivera,'0 the First Circuit held that the robbery of a local
Puerto Rican store could be aggregated with other potential
robberies, and thus, charged and convicted the robbers under the
Hobbs Act. This Comment will discuss why the court's decision to
apply the de minimis interference test on interstate commerce was
wrong" and why the court should have applied the substantial
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942).
6. See United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 238 (5th Cir. 1999)
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (stating that control over crime regulation has
traditionally fallen under the states' broad police powers); see also Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (explaining that the
constitutionally mandated balancing of powers between the states and federal
government was adopted by the Framers to ensure that the citizenry's
fundamental liberties were fully protected).
7. Interference with Commerce by Threats or Violence (Hobbs) Act 18
U.S.C. § 1951(a) (West 2000). Section 1951 provides that:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce ...
by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or
threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a
plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
Id.I
When Congress passed the Hobbs Act, it was principally concerned with
overturning the United States Supreme Court case of United States v. Local
807 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, in which the Court determined
that the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 was inapplicable to extort labor
activities. Jaime Zimmerman, Notes, Rob Once, Serve Twice?: Punishment
Under Both the Federal Bank Robbery Act and the Hobbs Act Violates the
Double Jeopardy Clause, 9 NEV. L.J. 407, 425 (2009). During debate,
Representative Hancock reasoned that the bill was necessary because of the
"amazing decision of the Supreme Court" in the Local 807 case, which he
believed nullified the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934. 91 CONG. REC. 11, 900
(1945) (statement of Rep. Hancock).
8. The Hobbs Act defines commerce as "all commerce between any point in
a State . . . and any point outside thereof; [and] all commerce between points
within the same State through any place outside such State." 18 U.S.C. §
1951(b)(3); United States v. Lynch, 437 F.3d 902, 908 (9th Cir. 2006).
9. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960) (stating that the
charge that interstate commerce is affected is crucial because the federal
government's jurisdiction for the crime rests solely on the interference with
interstate commerce).
10. 555 F.3d 277 (1st Cir. 2009), petition for cert. denied, Sanchez-Rosado v.
United States, 130 U.S. 344 (2009).
11. See id. at 286, 293 (holding that the two robbers were guilty of a Hobbs
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effects test, which would have resulted in no Hobbs Act conviction,
as suggested by the Rivera-Rivera dissent. 12
Part II will explore both the substantial effects test 13 and the
de minimis test,14 each of which are used by the courts under the
Commerce Clause when determining whether an action affects
interstate commerce. After analyzing the different interstate
commerce tests, this Comment will focus on the interstate
commerce tests' relation to the Hobbs Act. This part will end with
an analysis of the Hobbs Act violation in the Rivera-Rivera case.
Part III will further analyze the Rivera-Rivera decision and
discuss why the court should have applied the substantial effects
test instead of the de minimis test. Finally, Part IV will propose
changing the appropriate interstate commerce test in Hobbs Act
violation cases to the substantial effects test.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Commerce Clause and the Tests Used to Determine an
Activity's Effect on Interstate Commerce
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 grants Congress the power to

regulate commerce.' 5 At the time the Constitution was ratified,
"commerce" was seen as consisting of selling, buying, bartering,
and the necessary transportation used to effectuate these
purposes.16 Throughout the history of Commerce Clause
regulation, much deference has been given to Congress's broad
Act violation because of a de minimis interference with interstate commerce).
12. See id. at 295 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (concluding that the court's nexus
to interstate commerce was insufficient when even wrongly applying a de
minimis standard of interference).
13. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (laying out
three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate pursuant to its
Commerce Clause power, including: (1) regulating the use of the interstate
commerce channels; (2) regulating and protecting the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3)
regulating those activities that have a substantial relation to interstate
commerce, such as those activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce).
14. See Riuera-Rivera 555 F.3d at 288-89 (applying a de minimis standard
under an aggregation principle that many local robberies in the aggregate will
have a negative effect on interstate commerce, thus this particular robbery
has a "de minimis" effect on interstate commerce and is thus punishable).
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
16. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585, 596-97 (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining
what the Framers had intended by allowing Congress to regulate the
commerce of the country, specifically pointing out that the idea of "commerce"
was not intended to give Congress a broad exercise of police power over the
country, and noting that the police powers was meant to be reserved to the
states); see also SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DIcTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

361 (4th ed. 1773) (defining commerce as "intercourse; exchange of one thing
for another; interchange of anything; trade; traffick").
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ability to regulate activities that have an effect on interstate
commerce.17 Activities directly affecting interstate commerce have
been held to be within the scope of Congress's power to regulate,
as have intrastate activities18 that are economic1 9 in nature. 20
The courts have essentially implemented two very different
standards to be used when determining if Congress has the power
to act under the Commerce Clause.

17. David C.Mangan, Note, Gonzales v. Raich: The "Statesas Laboratories"
Principle of Federalism Supports Prolonging California's Experiment, 51 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 521, 540 (2007); see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 537, 548 (1985) (stating that the scope of Congress' Commerce
Power authority is not limited by definitions of state sovereignty, and
Congress can properly regulate intrastate economic endeavors pursuant to its
broad Commerce Clause powers); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and
Reclamation Ass'n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981) (explaining that the Court
must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects
interstate commerce so long as a rational basis exists for such a finding);
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (noting
that Congress is not confined to regulating commerce among the states, but
rather has the power to make regulations so long as appropriate means exist
to attain a legitimate end, regardless of whether the activity is purely local in
nature); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941) (holding that
Congress's commerce power is not diminished by the exercise or non-exercise
of state power); see also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 1824 WL 2697 at *3
(1824) (holding that the power of Congress over interstate commerce may be
exercised to its fullest extent and acknowledges no limitations other than
those enumerated in the Constitution).
18. Intrastate activities are those which do not have an effect on interstate
commerce since the totality of the activity is completed within the state.
Generally, unless the activity is economic in nature, Congress is not able to
regulate intrastate activities. Lino A. Graglia, Essay, Lopez, Morrison, and
Raich- Federalism in the Rehnquist Court, 31 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 761,
776 (2008); see Noelle Formosa, Notes, Ganging Up on RICO: Narrowing
Gonzales v. Raich to Preserve the Significance of the JurisdictionalElements
as a Constitutional Limitation in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 135, 143 (2008) (stating that the
intrastate activities must substantially affect interstate commerce when
aggregated with other similar activities for the activity to be within Congress's
reach).
19. "Economics" refers to the "production, distribution, and consumption of
commodities." Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25-26 (2005) (citing WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966)).
20. Scott Schwartz, Note, The Hapless Ecosystem: A FederalistArgument in
Favor of an Ecosystem Approach to the Endangered Species Act, 95 VA. L. REV.
1325, 1336 (2009) (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000));
see also United States v. Morales-de Jesus, 372 F.3d 6, 18 (1st Cir. 2004)
(proclaiming that Congress's power to criminalize conduct under its commerce
power depends on the economic nature of the class of conduct as defined by
statute).
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1. The Lopez Standardof SubstantialEffects
The case of United States v. Lopez 21 came before the Supreme
Court because a high school student was arrested for carrying a
concealed handgun onto school property in violation of the GunFree School Zones Act of 1990.22 The alleged theory was that guns
physically moved in interstate commerce, and thus, Congress
could aggregate the movement of all guns in order to act pursuant
to its Commerce Clause powers in this particular instance. 23
However, the Court held that the proper test to be used was the
"substantial effects" test in order to determine an activity's effect
on interstate commerce. 24 The Court laid out three broad
categories for which Congress may regulate under its Commerce
Clause power, including the: (1) channels, (2) instrumentalities,
and (3) activities that have a substantial relation to interstate
commerce, such as those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce. 25 The majority of the litigated Commerce
Clause cases fall into the third category. This category is
comprised of intrastate activities that have traditionally been
aggregated 26 in order to prove their effect on interstate
commerce. 27 These intrastate activities must be of an economic
21. 514 U.S. 549.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A)-(B) (2006) provides that crime involving drugs
and guns is a nationwide problem which is exacerbated at the local level by
the interstate movement of drugs, guns, and gangs.
23. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551-52 (alleging that Congress was executing a welldefined constitutional commerce power to regulate activities that affect
interstate commerce by passing this legislation allowing Congress to punish
those offenders that brought guns into school grounds because the business of
all schools affect interstate commerce).
24. Id. at 559. When Congress intrudes upon a traditionally local concern,
the level of scrutiny must be heightened and the stricter substantial effects
test must be applied so as to preserve fundamental federalism principles.
Mangan, supranote 17, at 526.
25. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (pointing out the history of interstate
commerce, through the Wickard lens, has given Congress a substantial
amount of power to legislate in areas affecting commerce because of the
Court's powerlessness to enforce the limitations on Congress' commerce power
because all activities in one way or another effect commerce in at least a
minute way).
26. To aggregate something is to combine things into a single group or
total. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966). The

aggregation principle is based on the idea that an inferential chain can
establish an impact on interstate commerce. Kenton J. Skarin, Article, Not All
Violence is Commerce: Non-economic, Violent Criminal Activity, RICO, and
Limitations on Congress Under the Post Raich Commerce Clause, 13 TEX. REV.
L. & POL. 187, 208 (2009).
27. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124 (explaining that Congress's commerce
power appropriately extends to intrastate activities which so affect interstate
commerce in the aggregate that if it were not held to be within its power to
regulate, Congress would be obstructed from properly carrying out its
enumerated constitutional powers). This aggregation principle is based on the
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endeavor to satisfy the requisite Commerce Clause nexus. 28
2. Morrison and the Substantial Effects Test
The Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison29 used a

similar analysis of the substantial effects test as the Court in
Lopez.30 In Morrison, a former Virginia Tech student brought suit
under the Violence Against Women Act of 199431 against students
who had allegedly raped her.32 Once again, the theory was that
Congress could act under its Commerce Clause powers in order to
curb gender-inspired violence because this type of violence occurs
nationwide, across all state lines.33 Like in Lopez, the Court held
that Congress did not have the ability to regulate non-economic
conduct pursuant to its broad-reaching Commerce Clause
powers. 34 Such regulation and punishment of intrastate activities
that are not directed at the channels, instrumentalities, or goods
moving in interstate commerce has historically fallen to the
states. 35 Thus, because gender violence is non-economic in nature,
notion that several similar activities can impact commerce through a
proximate, inferential chain. Skarin, supra note 26, at 208 (citing United
States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 52-53 (1st Cir. 2007) (Boudin, C.J.,
concurring)).
28. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. The interstate commerce nexus required in the
Hobbs Act is satisfied "by proof of a probable or potential impact" upon
interstate commerce. Lynch, 437 F.3d at 909 (quoting United States v. Huynh,
60 F.3d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1995)). This simple nexus to interstate commerce
for robberies provides the federal government with a basic jurisdictional
element used to link local robberies by a single defendant to that of a federal
offense. Margaret H. Lemos, Article, The Commerce Power and Criminal
Punishment: Presumption of Constitutionality or Presumption of Innocence?,
84 TEx. L. REv. 1203, 1205-06 (2006). This jurisdictional element is
constitutionally mandated. See United States v. Cruz-Rivera, 357 F.3d 10, 14
(2004) (reasoning that, hypothetically, few would doubt that there is an
insufficient connection to interstate commerce if the underlying robbery
results in the shutting down of an interstate business).
29. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
30. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 (stating that the Supreme Court has
historically "upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activities only
where the activity is economic in nature."). The Court determined that the
aggregation principle should not be applied if these activities are noneconomic in nature. Id.
31. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, U.S.C. § 13981 (2006)
(invalidated). The Act was created so that all persons within the United States
would be free from gender motivated crimes. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 605; 42
U.S.C. § 13981(b).
32. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602, 604.
33. Id. at 609.
34. Id. at 617.
35. See id. at 617-18 (rejecting the argument that Congress can regulate
and punish non-economic, violent, criminal activities based solely on that
activities aggregate effect on interstate commerce, since such power is
traditionally kept within the province of the states); see also Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, *426 (1821) (holding that Congress clearly cannot
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the Court determined that Congress had no power to act.
3.

Gonzales and the De Minimis Effect

However, the overwhelming majority of appellate courts
continue to use a de minimis standard to determine a crime's
interstate commerce effect, 36 requiring only a minimal interference
with commerce to uphold congressional regulation.37 These
appellate court holdings were further strengthened when the
Supreme Court decided Gonzales v. Raich,3 8 reaffirming the use of
the aggregation principle of combining certain criminal conduct in
order to show a substantial interference with interstate
commerce.39 Under this test, Congress can act if it has a rational
basis for concluding that various acts, when aggregated together,
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 40

B. The Hobbs Act and Its Role in Commerce Clause Regulation
The Hobbs Act was enacted in 1948 to ensure the
criminalization of highway robbery and to protect trade and
punish felonies generally because this would be an invasion on states' rights).
36. See Craig M. Bradley, Federalism and the Federal Criminal Law, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 573, 575 (2004) (declaring the long held view of the federal
appellate courts that a mere de minimis interference on commerce would be
sufficient to prove the element of interstate commerce for certain federal
crimes).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Re, 401 F.3d 828, 834-35 (7th Cir. 2004)
(holding that a de minimis, or slight effect, on interstate commerce is
sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the crime affected interstate
commerce); United States v. Turner, 272 F.3d 380, 386 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding
that where the criminal victimization of a business establishment occurs, the
de minimis standard remains applicable); United States v. Mills, 204 F.3d 669,
671 (6th Cir. 2000) (remarking that the Sixth Circuit held that the de minimis
rule survives the holding in Lopez); United States v. Wang, 222 F.3d 234, 237
(6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the courts require the government only to
demonstrate a de minimis effect on interstate commerce to support a criminal
conviction).
38. 545 U.S. 1.
39. Id. at 18-19 (explaining that the growing of marijuana and the growing
of wheat, like in Wickard, are strikingly similar, and thus Congress had a
rational basis for concluding that leaving marijuana growing outside of the
federal scope for control via congressional commerce power would negatively
affect price and market conditions). Thus, the Court was able to determine
that a rational basis existed for concluding that Congress could properly
regulate the local growth of marijuana under its Commerce Clause authority.

Id. at 22.
40. Id.; See also Hickman, 179 F.3d at 232 (explaining that if a group of
acts in the aggregate would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
Congress may regulate those acts individually under its Commerce Clause
power). Some commentators have noted that the Court's decision in Raich
severely hampered the upstart federalism movement that had started a
decade previously with the decisions in Lopez and Morrison. Craig M. Bradley,
Whatever Happened to Federalism?,41 TRIAL 52, 52 (Aug. 2005).
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commerce 41 from interference by violence, threats, coercion, and
intimidation. 42 The Hobbs Act allows Congress to use its full
constitutional power to punish interference with interstate
commerce where the crime involves extortion, robbery, or physical
violence.43

Of particular concern in this Comment is the Hobbs Act's
determination that the federal government can punish those who
rob business establishments and persons involved with interstate
commerce. 44 The Hobbs Act's interstate commerce element in
robbery cases has often been proven by showing that the crime
depleted business assets that were engaged in interstate
commerce or by showing that the business was forced to close at
least temporarily. 45 Significantly, the Courts in both Lopez and
Morrison held that Congress could not regulate non-economic,
criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on
interstate commerce.46
41. 18 U.S.C. § 874 (2006). Section 874, the "Anti-Kickback Act" provides
that:
Whoever, by force, intimidation, or threat of procuring dismissal from
employment, or by any manner whatsoever induces any person
employed in the construction, prosecution, completion or repair of any
public building, public work, or building or work financed in whole or in
part by loans or grants from the United States, to give up any part of
the compensation to which he is entitled under his contract of
employment, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
42. See United States v. Miles, 122 F.3d 235, 243-45 (5th Cir. 1997)
(DeMoss, J., specially concurring) (explaining that although the Hobbs Act has
generally been given a very broad interpretation, the legislative history shows
that Congress was mainly concerned with criminalizing highway robbery as
well as a tool for the federal government to fight back against the growing
organized crime activities). In fact, the legislative history contains significant
evidence that Congress passed the Hobbs Act to combat highway robberies by
union members that were having a considerable impact on interstate
commerce with a daily occurrence rate of over 1,000. Id.
43. Stirone, 361 U.S. at 215. Additionally, such interference is outlawed in
any way or degree. Id. By enacting the Hobbs Act, Congress deemed robbery to
be an activity that may have substantial detrimental effects on interstate
commerce if repeated over and over again. See generally, H.R. REP. No. 79238, (1945), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1360, 1370.
44. See Capozzi, 486 F.3d at 726 (determining that the government can
establish the required effect on interstate commerce by proving that the
defendant's actions have minimally depleted the business' assets that is
engaged in interstate commerce); see also United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d
1065, 1087-91 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding sufficient evidence that the defendants
affected interstate commerce to support a Hobbs Act conviction where the
defendants robbed and extorted individuals engaged in interstate commerce).
45. Rivera-Rivera, 555 F.3d at 294 (Lipez, J., dissenting); Turner, 272 F.3d
at 387.
46. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618 (holding that the regulation and
punishment of violence, not directed at the channels, instrumentalities, or
goods involved in interstate commerce is purely a local power); see also Lopez,
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Additionally, a mandatory, minimum prison sentence of
twenty-five years is required for repeat offenders that use a
firearm during the course of a violent federal felony under the
Hobbs Act.4 7 Despite being a federal criminal minimum sentencing
statute, § 924(c) of the Gun Control Act of 1968 has been held to be
within the scope of the Commerce Clause because it both regulates
activities that arise out of commercial transactions, and it contains
a jurisdictional element which ensures an interstate commerce
analysis.48

C. The Application of a De Minimis Standard in United States v.
Rivera-Rivera to Prove an Interstate Commerce Nexus
In the Rivera-Rivera case, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the district court, finding that two men
who had engaged in a robbery of the Mufiiz Gallery, a lottery
ticket business in Caguas, Puerto Rico, were guilty of a Hobbs Act
violation.49 The appellate court determined that it only needed to
find a de minimis interference with commerce in order to sustain
the Hobbs Act conviction.50
514 U.S. at 583 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the regulation of
activities beyond the scope of commerce in the ordinary and usual sense of the
word is prohibited).
47. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (2006). Section 924(c)(1)(C)(i) provides,
"[i]n the case of a second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, the
person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years."
This statute in its entirety gives the mandatory minimum sentences for
federal criminal cases. Specifically, § 924(c), is known as the Gun Control Act
of 1968. Nicole Lybrand Westin, Case Survey, United States Supreme Court
Holds that Only a Temporal Link is Required Between the Carrying of
Explosives and the Making of a False Statement to a Customs Agent to Support
a Conviction for a False Statement, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 694, 695
(2009).
48. United States v. Staples, 85 F.3d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Harris, 108 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1997). But see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561
(stating that § 922(q), a criminal statute, was not within the scope of the
commerce clause).
49. See Rivera-Rivera, 555 F.3d at 280, 289 (finding that both defendants
had engaged in a robbery of a lottery ticket business in Caguas, and that this
robbery affected interstate commerce).
50. See id. at 286 (finding it to be well established that a de minimis
interference with interstate commerce is sufficient in order to sustain a
conviction under a Hobbs Act violation); see United States v. Cruz-Arroyo, 461
F.3d 69, 75 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding that a de minimis interference with
commerce is sufficient to sustain a Hobbs Act conviction for robbery); Capozzi,
347 F.3d at 335 (holding that "to prove a Hobbs Act violation, the government
must show only that the . . . conduct created a realistic probability of a de
minimis effect on interstate commerce.") (quoting United States v. Butt, 955
F.2d77, 80 n.2 (1st Cir. 1992)). But see Wang, 222 F.3d at 240 (agreeing that a
mere de minimis effect on interstate commerce is sufficient to support a Hobbs
Act conviction, but refusing to apply the de minimis standard in that
particular case because the robbery victim was robbed inside of a private
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To support its conclusion of a de minimis interference, the
court noted that the Puerto Rican lottery ticket business was
engaged in interstate commerce because the business's lottery
machines had been manufactured in Rhode Island, and the
business occasionally served tourists.51 The court reasoned that
past lottery machine purchases from interstate vendors was
sufficient proof of interstate commerce. 52 Furthermore, the court
reasoned that any indirect link that can be established to
interstate commerce will be sufficient to overcome the minimal de
minimis interference requirement.5 3

The majority's opinion was met with a strong dissent in the
case. 54 While acknowledging that the interstate commerce
component of the Hobbs Act violation is a critical factor in this
case, the dissent argued that the evidence did not meet even the
"modest requirement" of proving a de minimis effect on interstate
commerce.55 Of particular concern to the dissent was the inability
of the business owner to prove that his business had presently
been engaging in interstate commerce or was planning on
engaging in future interstate purchases upon which the robbery

residence, despite the fact that the victim was a business owner and the
money stolen from the business owner-victim was from business funds).
51. See Rivera-Rivera, 555 F.3d at 287-88 (finding that, pursuant to a
stipulation made at trial, the lottery ticket machines were manufactured in
Rhode Island and from there were shipped to Puerto Rico for installation, also
finding that, pursuant to the same stipulation, tourists occasionally bought
tickets from the business). When a business is robbed, the government may
demonstrate that the robbery affected interstate commerce by first proving
that the business robbed was engaged in interstate commerce. Id. at 286.
Thus, by finding that the machines were manufactured in Rhode Island and
then shipped to Puerto Rico, and further finding that the business occasionally
had tourists as customers, the court deemed the business to have been
engaged in interstate commerce. Id. at 287.
52. See id. at 288 (explaining that past interstate commerce purchases were
sufficient to allow a jury to infer that the business would be making similar
purchases in the future. But see id. at 295 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (arguing that
there was no indication in the record that interstate purchases had been made
since the lottery machines were brought to Puerto Rico from Rhode Island
initially, and arguing that there was no indication that the lottery business
had any plans of acquiring new machines at any point in the foreseeable
future). Thus, if the record lacks proof of future interstate purchasing by the
business, the robbery could not have had any impact on the business'
interstate commerce. Id. at 295 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
53. See id. at 289 (finding that indirect links establishing interstate
commerce are sufficient and also finding the lottery ticket machines were not
the only nexus available to establish an interstate commerce link because
United States mainland tourists still occasionally visit the business).
54. Id. at 293 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 294 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (stating that establishing a federal
interest in crimes typically of concern to states is a critical component of the
Hobbs Act, and the government failed to meet their burden in this case).
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could have had an impact. 56 Because the Hobbs Act requires proof
that the robbery impeded interstate business dealings, and
because the business owner in this matter was unable to prove
that the robbery affected future interstate purchases, the dissent
determined that there was an insufficient nexus to interstate
commerce.57
With the Rivera-Rivera case decided in the prism of Gonzales,
there remains dispute about which test future courts should use
when determining whether an activity affects interstate
commerce. With several appellate courts in recent years following
the Court's lead in Gonzales and pursuing a de minimis
requirement test, ideals of federalism have begun to erode,
eliminating a substantial impediment to Congress's ability to
usurp state police powers.58
III. ANALYSIS
A. The IntrusionMasked as 'De Minimis" Interference
The Hobbs Act is designed to punish criminal offenders who
have committed violations affecting interstate commerce.59 In this
way, the Hobbs Act is not targeting any type of economic activity
specifically.6 0 However, the Hobbs Act does punish violent criminal
offenders. Punishing violent criminals that are not affecting any
type of economic activity specifically would seem to contrast
significantly with the Court in Morrison's rejection of the
argument that Congress could regulate non-economic, violent

56. See id. at 295 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (noting that the business owner
was unable to prove that he regularly engaged in interstate commerce or that
the robbery impacted any plans for future interstate business).
57. See id. (Lipez, J., dissenting) (stating that the possible purchase of
replacement equipment at an undefined point in the future is insufficient to
establish the Hobbs Act requirement for an interstate commerce nexus).
58. See Ilya Somin, A False Dawn for Federalism: Clear Statement Rules
After Gonzales v. Raich, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 113, 113 (2005-2006)
(explaining that the decision in Gonzales "severely undermined" the hope that
the Supreme Court may change direction after the Lopez and Morrison
decisions and pursue placing meaningful constitutional limitations on
Congress' powers); see Mangan, supra note 17, at 541 (arguing that allowing
Congress to exert too broad of authority pursuant to its Commerce Clause
powers would affect the integrity of the federalism system).
59. See Zimmerman, supra note 7, at 423 (stating that the Hobbs Act
requires proof that the robbery offense affected interstate commerce).
60. See Hickman, 179 F.3d at 231 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (stating
that the Hobbs Act is not a tool used to "target any class of product, process, or
market, or indeed even commercial victims"); see also Randy E. Barnett,
Foreword: Limiting Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 743, 749 (2005)
(observing that most violent crimes may not count as "production, distribution,
or consumption of commodities" as had been the case of previous interstate
commerce cases).
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criminal conduct based solely on some perceived aggregate effect
that such criminal conduct could have on interstate commerce. 6 '
Robbery undoubtedly is a violent crime. 62 And, with questions
remaining about whether robbery is an economic crime, 63 it is
confounding that proof of an effect upon interstate commerce need
only require a de minimis showing of interference instead of the
stricter substantial effects standard. Requiring a mere de minimis
interference standard allows Congress considerable authority in
the realm of police power, expanding on Congress's limited and
enumerated constitutional powers. 64 Congress has never been
granted such a national police power and allowing Congress to act
pursuant to some perceived minimal underlying effect on
interstate commerce would open the floodgates to a national police
power.65 Such a national police power would be a direct violation of
traditional federalism principles that our Constitution was
founded upon. 66 As the majority feared in Lopez, allowing
61. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617.
62. Press Release, The Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Releases

Preliminary

Annual

Crime

Statistics

for

2009

(May

24,

2010),

http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-preliminary-annu
Al-crime-statistics-for-2009/. The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) has
labeled robbery as a violent crime in their crime index reports. Id.
63. See Thane Rehn, Note, RICO and the Commerce Clause: A
Reconsideration of the Scope of Federal Criminal Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1991, 2031 (2008) (advocating that robbery is not an economic crime because,
although it may be committed for economic gain, it involves neither the
production nor voluntary exchange of goods or services); see also Hickman, 179
F.3d at 237-38 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (stating that robbery, as
criminal conduct, is outside the scope of economic activity).
64. See United States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95, 101 (5th Cir. 1995) (declaring
that the federal government has limited and enumerated powers, with police
powers generally reserved to the states).
65. See Hickman, 179 F.3d at 238 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting)
(concluding that, along with the regulation of firearm control, control over
robbery crimes have traditionally been held by the states pursuant to their
control over law enforcement); see also Wang, 222 F.3d at 240 (confirming that
upholding federal jurisdiction over a robbery violation under the Hobbs Act
essentially acknowledges a general federal police power). Because there is
ambiguity over the economic status of robbery crimes, and because robbery is
a traditional target of these states' law enforcement personnel, robbery should
be considered a non-economic crime that should not be aggregated in order to
find an effect on interstate commerce. Id.
66. See Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United
States, Dwight D. Opperman Lecture, Why Federalism Matters (Sept. 24,
1999), in 48 DRAKE L. REV. 231, 233 (2000) (describing the Constitution as one
that:
aims to provide enough power to government to insure that the rights of
the people would be secure from both foreign invasion and domestic
unrest; but a Constitution that also aims to prevent government from
becoming the destroyer of rights, by granting the government only
specified, enumerated powers . . . . It

remains a just, legitimate

government only so long as it stays within the bounds established by its
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Congress to enact any type of legislation it wished under the guise
of interstate commerce would give Congress the very plenary
police power that has not been authorized in the Constitution.67
In relying on a de minimis interference standard with
commerce, courts implicitly rely on the aggregation principle, in
that similar robberies like this one would substantially affect
interstate commerce, giving Congress the power to regulate under
its commerce power.68 However, given that these cases concern
robbery, 69 this would appear to be another departure from the
Morrison decision, where the Court held that non-economic,
violent conduct could not be aggregated in order to show an effect
on interstate commerce.70 By allowing this aggregation, Congress
is merely usurping traditional state police power functions,
attaining powers not expressly granted to them by the
Constitution.7 1
B. The Intrusion's Effect in the Rivera-Rivera Decision

Rivera-Rivera exemplifies how appellate courts have handled
the interstate commerce aspects of Hobbs Act violations in the
wake of Lopez, Morrison, and Gonzales. The Rivera-Rivera

decision established that it need only find a de minimis
interference with commerce in order to sustain that aspect of the

charter, our Constitution.).
67. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566; see also Thomas, supra note 66, at 235 (noting
that federalism provides a check on the national government in a way that the
separation of powers alone could not do).
68. See generally, Rivera-Rivera, 555 F.3d at 297 (Lipez, J., dissenting)
(explaining that the majority applied a de minimis test because, unlike the
statutes in question in Lopez and Morrison, the Hobbs Act includes a
jurisdictional element to ensure that robberies are viewed, on a case-by-case
analysis, as affecting interstate commerce). However, by giving Congress the
power to cherry pick the robbery cases in which it wishes to pursue a Hobbs
Act violation, Congress is given the power to ignore fundamental principles of
federalism, blurring the distinction between traditional local police powers
and Congress' ability to act under the Hobbs Act. See Stephen R. McAllister,

Essay, Is There a Judicially Enforceable Limit to CongressionalPower Under
the Commerce Clause?, 44 U. KAN. L. REv. 217, 232 (1996) (arguing that if
Congress is allowed to decide which situations it wishes to intervene and
override state autonomy, such as by exercising a general national police
power, the delineation between federal and state authority becomes blurred).
69. The FBI places robbery in the violent crime classification. See supra
note 60 and accompanying text.
70. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 (rejecting the argument that Congress
has the ability, pursuant to its commerce power, to regulate non-economic,
violent criminal conduct based solely on that violent criminal conduct's
aggregate effect on interstate commerce).
71. See Thomas, supra note 66, at 236 (arguing that federalism creates
independent sovereigns with their own government, plenary control over its
citizenry, and the ability to administer in areas such as criminal punishment
with substantial policy-making freedoms).
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Hobbs Act violation. 72 To prove that the robbery affected interstate
commerce, the court determined that the lottery ticket business
engaged in interstate commerce through out-of-state product
purchases, serving out-of-state customers, the depletion of the
business's assets, and temporary closure that the robbery caused. 73
1. The Argument That the Lottery Ticket Business Engaged in
InterstateCommerce by PurchasingProductsfrom Out-ofState
The court in Rivera-Rivera relied on the fact that some of the
Mufiiz Gallery's lottery ticket machines were manufactured in
Rhode Island before being shipped to Puerto Rico for installation.74
The court's theory was that the lottery ticket business benefitted
from this interstate transaction, and thus, must have engaged in
interstate commerce.75 With evidence of past interstate commerce
purchases by the Mufiiz Gallery stipulated to, the majority
reasoned that a jury could infer that the robbery prevented the
business from potentially making future interstate commerce
purchases.78 Because these potential future interstate commerce
purchases would have been affected by the robbery, the court
reasoned that a de minimis interference on interstate commerce
was established.77
However, there were several aspects that the court in RiveraRivera overlooked regarding the court's past purchases theory.
First and foremost, the court paid little attention to the fact that
the lottery ticket and gaming machines were not even purchased
directly from the Rhode Island manufacturer by the Mufiiz
Gallery.78 The Mufiiz Gallery actually leased the gaming machines
72. See Rivera-Rivera, 555 F.3d at 286 (determining it to be wellestablished that the court need only find a de minimis interference with
commerce to sustain a Hobbs Act conviction).
73. Id.
74. See id. at 287 (determining that the stipulated testimony of Mufiiz,
declaring his business used lottery ticket terminals that were manufactured in
Rhode Island, was sufficient for the government to prove that the business had
purchased goods from out of state).
75. See id. (declaring that the government's introduction of evidence, via
the stipulated testimony of Mufiiz, that the lottery ticket machines were
purchased from Rhode Island was sufficient evidence to determine that the
local lottery ticket business was engaged in interstate commerce).
76. See id. at 288 (determining that a jury could reasonably infer from the
past purchases that the Mufiiz Gallery was engaged in regular interstate
commerce purchases since all of the machine parts were brought in from
Rhode Island).
77. Id. at 289.
78. See id. at 295 n.19 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (noting that the evidence
suggested that Mufiiz obtained the machines from the Puerto Rican
Department of the Treasury, and this governmental entity was responsible for
purchasing the machines from the Rhode Island manufacturer).
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from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's Department of the
Treasury, which brought the machines to Puerto Rico from Rhode
Island.79 Such a leasing arrangement is at best an attenuatedo
stretch by a court to find an interstate commerce nexus, 81
especially when the nexus attempting to be created arises out of
an aggregation of a violent, non-economic activity, something that
82
the Court in Morrison expressly prohibited.
Additionally, the argument that past interstate commerce
purchases can suffice to show an effect on interstate commerce is
in direct violation of the Hobbs Act language itself.83 The Hobbs
Act requires that the robbery offense must have potentially
impeded the business's interstate dealings. 84 However, the Mufiiz
Gallery was not presently engaged in interstate commerce, and
the Gallery had no foreseeable plans of engaging in interstate
85
commerce via future purchases at the time of the robbery. Unlike
when an establishment engages in interstate commerce on a
regular basis, an interstate commerce effect cannot be presumed
86
here merely because a robbery occurred.
In this case, the robbery did not have any effect on the
business's interstate commerce transactions.8 7 Virtually every
business today uses some item that was purchased from a
company in a different state.88 However, because the court used
79. Id.
80. A mere possibility of future substantial effects on interstate commerce
is much too attenuated in order to be a constitutional exercise of congressional
power. GDF Realty Investments, LTD v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 638 (6th Cir.
2003).
81. A nexus is a means of causal connection used to link a series or a group.
DIcTIONARY,
ONLINE
WEBSTER
MERRIAM
definition,
Nexus
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Nexus.
82. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617. Such an indirect link has been allowed to
establish the requisite interstate commerce nexus because the crime of
robbery causes a depletion of the business' assets indirectly engaged in
interstate commerce, thereby potentially affecting interstate commerce. See
United States v. Elias, 285 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a robbery
of a local business may be said to affect interstate commerce because the
robbery impairs the business' ability to acquire goods originating from out-ofstate locations).
83. See Rivera-Rivera, 555 F.3d at 295 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (finding that
the Hobbs Act requires proof that the particular robbery in question
potentially prevented the business from pursuing its interstate dealings).
84. See Capozzi, 347 F.3d at 336 (explaining that the Hobbs Act requires
that the robbery in question affects interstate commerce based on a case-bycase, fact-specific analysis).
85. Rivera-Rivera, 555 F.3d at 295 (Lipez, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 296.
87. Id. (determining that the mere possibility of a future effect on interstate
commerce 18 U.S.C. § 874, one that may not occur for several years, is not
sufficient proof of an effect on interstate transactions).
88. See id. at 298 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (stating that virtually every
business has some item that was purchased from out-of-state, be it something
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the de minimis standard to prove interference on interstate
commerce, the court aggregated similar robberies together with
the Rivera-Rivera robbery to show an effect on interstate
commerce.89 To a logical extreme, aggregating such robberies
under the Hobbs Act would seem to embrace the concept that
Congress can punish virtually all local robberies.9 0
2. The Argument That the Muihiz Gallery Served Out-of-State
Tourists, Thus Satisfying an Interstate Commerce Nexus
The court in Rivera-Rivera noted that even if the Mufiiz
Gallery's past interstate commerce purchases were insufficient to
establish an interstate commerce nexus, the fact that the Gallery
occasionally served tourists from the United States mainland was
also sufficient to establish the effect the robbery had on interstate
commerce.9 1 The owner of the Gallery, Muniz, stated under
stipulated testimony that tourists knew the Gallery had lottery
ticket and gaming machines and occasionally visited to purchase
such tickets. 92
This argument, similar to the argument that the gaming
device purchases from the Rhode Island manufacturer, fails to
establish an effect on interstate commerce. The effect on interstate
commerce from a handful of tourists being prevented from
entering the Mufiiz Gallery for a day because of a robbery appears
to be minimalistic at best.98 The lottery ticket business was not
paramount to the company's function or merely a rug or painting).
89. Id. at 289; see Hickman, 179 F.3d at 232 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting)
(noting that the Supreme Court has recognized an aggregation principle since
the Wickard decision, concluding that interstate commerce can be
substantially affected if a myriad of similar instances occur together).
However, this aggregation has not been allowed to extend to aggregation of
violent criminal conduct. See id. at 235 (noting that a rule stating that violent,
non-economic criminal conduct cannot be aggregated to show a substantial
effect on interstate commerce would be consistent with Supreme Court
precedent); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (explaining that, in order to be
aggregated, the conduct must be economic in nature).
90. Rivera-Rivera, 555 F.3d at 298 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (noting that the
majority's line of reasoning essentially places all local robberies under the
power of the federal government to punish under the Hobbs Act because the
nexus between the robbery and interstate commerce has become too
attenuated). However, the Hobbs Act robbery provisions were intended to be
utilized only in instances involving organized crime or other gang-related
activity; by punishing offenders of traditional local robbery, the Hobbs Act is
being interpreted too broadly than it was intended to be. U.S. ATTORNEY'S
MANUAL, §9-131.040 (Apr. 1999).
91. Rivera-Rivera, 555 F.3d at 288.
92. Id. at 287, n.10 (testifying that when tourists come from the mainland
United States, some of them purchase lottery tickets from the Mufiiz Gallery
and others play in the gaming room).
93. Id. at 297 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (noting that there was no evidence that
the sale of lottery tickets to involved engaging in interstate commerce, nor
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advertising in out-of-state markets, and the tickets were locally
produced merchandise. 94 The court determined that despite this
mountain of evidence, a de minimis interference with commerce
was satisfied by evidence that tourists were occasional customers
of the lottery ticket business. In this way, the court expanded the
definition of what it means to be engaged in interstate commerce,
allowing Congress to punish more offenders than it normally could
because of a lack of a federal police power.95 Extending this
argument to the furthest reaches of logic, one who robs a Chicago
street vendor serving food to tourists made with cheese products
from Milwaukee could be held in violation of the Hobbs Act.9 6
The Argument That the Rivera-Rivera Robbery Depleted
the Assets of the Murliz Gallery
The Rivera-Rivera decision found that the robbery at issue
depleted the assets of the Mufiiz Gallery, thereby affecting its
ability to conduct interstate business.9 7 The lottery business was
indeed robbed of nearly $9,000, depleting its ability to conduct
interstate business as usual and creating the possibility that the
3.

evidence of a realistic probability that interstate commerce was affected by
this particular robbery).
94. Id. (explaining that the purchaser does not become an actor in
interstate commerce merely by being from out-of-state when the sale is of a
locally produced product). But see United States v. Rodriguez, 218 F.3d 1243,
1245 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that the robbery at issue constituted a
Hobbs Act violation because there was evidence that the motels, at some point,
had registered guests from out-of-state, sufficient to establish a connection to
interstate commerce); see also United States v. Pearson, 508 F.2d 595, 597
(5th Cir. 1975) (concluding that a hotel was engaged in interstate commerce
because the hotel had guest registration cards of people from out-of-state,
thereby sufficiently establishing that the robbery affected interstate
commerce).
95. See Rivera-Rivera, 555 F.3d at 297 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the court's interpretation that tourists making purchases at the business is
sufficient to establish an interstate commerce nexus is an expansion of
Congress's Commerce Clause powers from the Lopez and Morrison holdings,
reaching into areas of traditional local concerns); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at
577 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (fearing that if the federal government was
allowed to take over regulation of a traditionally local concern that had little
to do with the regulation of commercial activities would blur the lines between
state and federal authority).
96. See Hickman, 179 F.3d at 231 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting)
(determining that, in a similar situation, taking a child's lemonade may
potentially be allowed to aggregate in a Hobbs Act violation to sustain a Hobbs
Action conviction); see also McAllister, supra note 68, at 232 (noting that this
blurring of federal and state authority lines may result in ineffective
government).
97. Rivera-Rivera, 555 F.3d at 288 (relying on the testimony of Muiniz, who
testified via stipulation that the Mufiiz Gallery's shutdown of operations on
the day of the robbery is sufficient to establish that the depletion of assets
inhibited the possible purchases in interstate transactions).
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Mufiiz Gallery would be prevented from engaging in interstate
transactions because of the robbery.98 Once again, the court relied
on the premise that a de minimis interference is shown through
this analysis by relying on the aggregation principle that other
similar robberies, aggregated together, would have an effect on
interstate commerce.99

However, this argument presumes that the depleted assets
would have been used to continue regular interstate purchases.100
As the record indicates, the business did not have any plans to
make more interstate purchases in the foreseeable future.10 '
Because it was not realistically probable that the depleted assets
would be used in interstate transactions, sustaining a conviction
for a violent, non-economic crime through mere speculation is once
again an attenuated interstate commerce nexus.1 02
4. The Argument That the Robbery Caused a Temporary
Closure of the Muihiz Gallery, Thereby Affecting Interstate
Commerce
Finally, the Rivera-Rivera court pointed out that the robbery
resulted in a temporary closure of the business for one day. 0 3 The
business was thus unable to bring in interstate money from out-ofstate tourists that may have entered the Gallery on that day.104
This speculative loss was sufficient because the court needed to
find only a de minimis interference with interstate commerce to
sustain the Hobbs Act conviction.

98. Id. at 286, 294.
99. Id. at 286, n.8. But see Hickman, 179 F.3d at 231, n.1 (Higginbotham,
J., dissenting) (concluding that the proof of a substantial effect on interstate
commerce should not be allowed to be achieved by aggregating diverse and
separate instances of intrastate activities where this is not a rational basis for
concluding that there is a sufficient connection between the activities).
100. See Rivera-Rivera, 555 F.3d at 295 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (noting that,
under a de minimis standard for interference, the $9,000 loss would be
sufficient to establish a Hobbs Act violation). The lack of proof that there was
anticipated interstate commerce purchases at the time of the robbery shows
that the robbery did not affect the business's ability to conduct interstate
business by this depletion of assets. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id. (noting that the business's loss of $9,000 cannot be reasonably
presumed to affect an interstate transaction that may not occur for several
years).
103. Id. at 286.
104. Id. (laying out the idea that the temporary closured resulted in the
potential loss of business from potential tourists). But see id. at 297 (Lipez, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out that the mere sale of a locally produced product to a
purchaser buying locally does not transform the transaction into an interstate
transaction merely because the purchaser is from out-of-state).
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C. PuttingIt All Together: The De Minimis Standard'sEffect on
the Rivera-Rivera Decision

Because the court in Rivera-Rivera needed to find only a de
minimis interference, indirect and attenuated connections to
interstate commerce sufficed for the majority to conclude that the
robberies affected interstate commerce. 105 This de minimis
standard allowed the court to loosely apply interstate commerce
connections which only further blurred the lines between federal
and state crimes, effectively eliminating federalism protections.106
Essentially, the court has determined a de minimis interference
with interstate commerce occurs when machines are indirectly
obtained from an out-of-state manufacturer and when a purchaser
from out-of-state purchases locally produced merchandise.1 07 This
line of reasoning should no longer apply, as courts should instead
apply the substantial effects test as laid out in Lopez to future
Hobbs Act cases.
IV. PROPOSAL
The Hobbs Act should be amended to require proof of a
substantial effect on interstate commerce in all Hobbs Act
convictions. Such an amendment to the Hobbs Act would curb
Congress's Commerce Clause powers to more properly fit under
the Court's jurisprudence in Morrison. While the Court in
Gonzales may have altered the perception of Congress's powers
under the Commerce Clause after Lopez and Morrison, it did
nothing to alter the Court in Morrison's determination that
Congress could not act pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers
105. Id. at 298 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority's
determination that a de minimis interference with interstate commerce has
been proven by indirect nexuses).
106. See id. (stating that the de minimis standard cannot be applied so
loosely or else the interstate commerce element of a Hobbs Act violation will
no longer serve to distinguish between federal and state crimes, effectively
giving Congress complete control over all local robbery crimes). This approach
followed by the Courts of Appeal after the Gonzales decision has
fundamentally altered the federalism protections that the Morrison court had
articulated in its decision, requiring a proof of a substantial effect on
interstate commerce before Congress would have the power to regulate in the
area. See Jonathan H. Adler, Symposium Article, Is Morrison Dead?Assessing
a Supreme Drug (Law) Overdose, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 751, 751 (2005)
(noting that Supreme Court "hollowed out" the core contemporary federalism
principles in Commerce Clause jurisprudence with its decision in Gonzales).
107. See Rivera-Rivera, 555 F.3d at 298 (Lipez, J., dissenting) (concluding
that the majority has determined that speculative, future replacement of
items previously purchased in interstate commerce suffices to establish an
interstate commerce nexus, effectively making all local robberies punishable
under the Hobbs Act); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (explaining that the
Court refuses to pile inference upon inference so as to convert congressional
commerce authority to a general police power retained by the States).
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when the activity in question is non-economic and violent.108
Because Hobbs Act robbery cases are non-economic and violent in
nature, Congress should not be allowed to use its Commerce
Clause powers to legislate.10 9
Federal jurisdiction in Hobbs Act violation cases still depends
upon an initial inquiry into the commercial nature of the entity
that was robbed. 10 Because the federal government's authority to
act in Hobbs Act violation cases rests solely on the finding of an
interference with interstate commerce, it is imperative that some
interference with commerce be identified."' The Gonzales decision
allowed the Appellate Courts to fully embrace the de minimis
test. 112
However, the de minimis test has been too liberally
construed, allowing aggregation of fundamentally non-economic
activities, such as robbery, under the Hobbs Act.1 3 The
aggregation principle used in Hobbs Act cases has made finding a
substantial effect on interstate commerce a very easy task for the
government. With its burden significantly reduced, the
government is able to pursue more crimes that have a causal
correlation with interstate commerce.
The lax burden of merely needing to find a de minimis
interference with interstate commerce has created a system of
justice that allows for attenuated connections with interstate
commerce to suffice for an interference with commerce.114
108. See Brian Nisbet, Comment, What Can RICO Not Do?: RICO and the
Non-Economic Intrastate Enterprise That Perpetrates only Non-Economic
Racketeering Activity, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 509, 510 (2009) (noting
that Congress, after Gonzales v. Raich, could regulate non-economic intrastate
activity if the activity was done in furtherance of a larger and valid regulatory
scheme, but noting the silence with regards to any mention of overturning the
Morrison determination that Congress could not regulate violent criminal
activity under its commerce power.
109. See George D. Brown, Article, Counterrevolution?-NationalCriminal
Law After Raich, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 947, 999 (2005) (advocating that robbery is
neither an economic nor a commercial activity).
110. Brown, supra note 109, at 999. However, courts continue to avoid
adopting a categorical rule against regulating noncommercial, intrastate
activities. Instead, courts continue to rely on the different factors outlined in
Morrison,Gonzales, and Lopez. Adler, supra note 106, at 760.
111. See Stirone, 361 U.S. at 218 (declaring the charge that interstate
commerce is affected is a crucial element of the Hobbs Act test because the
federal government's jurisdiction to act rests solely on that interference).
112. See generally United States v. Bailey, 227 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 2000)
(declaring that the overwhelming authority of case law supports the notion
that a mere minimal effect on interstate commerce, rather than a substantial
effect, is necessary).
113. Hickman, 179 F.3d at 231 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
114. See Norton, 326 F.3d at 630, 638 (declaring that substantial effects on
interstate commerce have begun to be found in more hypothetical, attenuated
interstate commerce cases because of the aggregation principle).
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However, allowing such indirect nexuses to establish this element
of the Hobbs Act is giving Congress more power to act in an area
traditionally reserved for state police enforcement.11s
Thus, the use of the substantial effects test is necessary
because it would prevent attenuated connections to interstate
commerce from being used to satisfy the interstate commerce
element of a Hobbs Act conviction.' 1 6 Additionally, use of the
substantial effects test would provide a safeguard for fundamental
federalism principles by ensuring that the states retain their
traditionally held police powers.1 1 7
A.

Use of the SubstantialEffects Test Would Require the
Government to Prove a Direct Connection with Interstate
Commerce in Hobbs Act Cases

Rivera-Rivera is the perfect example of why courts should
strongly consider using the substantial effects test in Hobbs Act
cases as opposed to the de minimis test. In relying on the Mufiiz
Gallery's indirect, attenuated connection to interstate commerce,
the Rivera-Rivera decision showed just how far appellate courts
have been willing to go to find that a mere de minimis interference
with interstate commerce is sufficient to sustain a Hobbs Act
conviction. The Court found it insignificant that the Mufiiz Gallery
had not purchased their lottery ticket machines directly in
interstate commerce. Similarly, the Court deemed it irrelevant
that the Mufiiz Gallery had no plans to make future purchases in
interstate commerce. The Court found that the interstate
commerce nexus had been satisfied because the lottery ticket
machines were indirectly obtained from the Puerto Rican Treasury
Department in interstate commerce. Thus, the Rivera-Rivera
decision essentially determined that the robbery of a local
business, with no present or future intentions of engaging in
business interstate, substantially affected interstate commerce.1 18
With the ability to aggregate this minor robbery of a local
lottery ticket business with other similar robberies under the de
minimis standard, the government has been given incredible
115. John Panneton, Article, FederalizingFires: The Evolving Response to
Arson Related Crimes, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 151, 161 (1985).
116. Some appellate courts have held that, "the possibility of future
substantial effects .

.

. on interstate commerce .

.

. is simply too hypothetical

and attenuated. . . to pass constitutional muster." Norton, 326 F.3d at 638.
117. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566-67; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618; Collins, 40 F.3d at
101; Cohens, 19 U.S. at 426.
118. Rivera-Rivera, 555 F.3d at 289. Pursuant to the three broad categories
that the Court in Lopez laid out as to when Congress may act under its
Commerce Clause powers, the Rivera-Rivera decision relied upon Congress's
power to regulate those activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (listing the three types of areas that
Congress may act pursuant to its Commerce Clause power).
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leeway by the court in Rivera-Rivera to prove a substantial
interference with interstate commerce. The government in RiveraRivera did not even have to prove a direct connection to interstate
commerce.119 As the Court noted in Morrison, "[t]he regulation and
punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the
instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate
commerce has always been the province of the States."120 With
such an indirect, attenuated connection to commerce deemed
satisfactory by the de minimis test, there seems to be no end in
sight to the government's ability to prosecute any robbery as a
Hobbs Act violation.
Inevitably, something from every store or market has at one
time or another moved in interstate commerce. Even street
vendors often have products in their carts that have been produced
in other states.121 Following the Rivera-Rivera precedent in Hobbs
Act cases, any robbery could be indirectly linked to an aspect of
interstate commerce that would allow the government a near
universal police power in robbery cases. Allowing this past
movement in interstate commerce to suffice as interstate
commerce under the de minimis test, especially when it is
unconnected to the underlying robbery, is in direct violation of the
Lopez holding. 122
There can be little doubt that the Rivera-Rivera robbery, by
itself, did not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
The only real connection to interstate commerce that was directly
impacted by the robbery was the occasional tourist that was
prevented from purchasing a ticket. Under the substantial effects
test, requiring that the robbery have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce to satisfy the Hobbs Act element of interstate
commerce, this robbery would not have been found to be a Hobbs
Act violation because there was not direct substantial interference
with interstate commerce.
B. The SubstantialEffects Test Provides the Best Safeguard to
Basic FederalismPrinciples
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the Rivera-Rivera
case is a failure of the Court to protect federalism principles and
further proof that the Hobbs Act must be amended to contain
substantial effect language. An amended Hobbs Act would prohibit
119. Rivera-Rivera,555 F.3d at 289.
120. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.
121. See Hickman, 179 F.3d at 231 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (quipping
that if courts continue to require only needing to find a de minimis
interference with interstate commerce in robbery cases, then the taking of a
child's lemonade from her lemonade stand would also potentially be included
as a Hobbs Act violation as well).
122. Bradley, supra note 36, at 578.
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Congress from future overextensions into areas of traditional state
concerns. 123 A de minimis standard, through its aggregation effect,
inherently gives Congress the ability to legislate in a criminal law
124
Such a
area that has been traditionally reserved to the states.
been
have
usurpation of traditional state powers could never
intended by the Framers because the Framers intentionally did
not give the federal government a federal police power.125
Federalism works in this way to ensure that a healthy balance of
power is shared between the states and the federal government,
126
thereby reducing the possibility of abuse by either one.
Use of the substantial effects test is much more conducive to
upholding and protecting the federalism principles embodied in
the Constitution. Use of this test, instead of the de minimis test
used in Rivera-Rivera, would ensure that Congress could continue
to punish robberies that substantially effect interstate commerce
on their own. However, Congress would be prevented from
punishing more local robberies that do not directly have a
127
This would
substantial interference with interstate commerce.
in order
powers
police
allow the states' full use of their traditional
whether
about
concern
to crackdown on regular robberies, without
their jurisdiction is proper in the situation. Thus, the substantial
effects test would provide the states with the ability to check the
federal government's broad power under the Commerce Clause,
123. See Collins, 40 F.3d at 101 (stating that the Hobbs Act clearly was only
intended to reach certain activities having an effect on interstate commerce,
and that the States are in the most suitable position to enforce general
criminal laws); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (stating that,

unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, congressional acts will not be

deemed to significantly change the federalism balance between the national
and state governments); see also Mangan, supra note 17, at 541 (arguing that
allowing Congress's authority to reach too broadly would affect the integrity of
the federalism system). But see United States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836, 843 (8th
Cir. 1996) (declaring that the court has little doubt that Congress has the
power to protect businesses from violence that is connected to an interstate
chain).
124. See Thomas, supra note 66, at 235-236 (stating that, under basic
fundamental principles, states still retain jurisdiction over the great majority
of policymaking that affects the daily lives of its citizens). Contra United
States v. Bailey 990 F.2d 119, 126 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that the Tenth
Amendment does not bar the federal government from enforcing its laws, even
when state laws exist addressing the same criminal act).
125. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 596-97 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (declaring that
the Supreme Court has always rejected reading the Commerce Clause in a
light that would grant Congress the ability to exercise a federal police power).
126. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (stating that a
healthy balance of power-sharing between the states and the federal
government is critical in reducing the risk of tyranny and abuses of authority
by either side).
127. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (noting that, in using this substantial effects
test, simply because Congress concludes that a particular activity has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so).
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ensuring that the states retain control over the police powers. 128
V. CONCLUSION
The substantial effects test is much more suited for use in
Hobbs Act robbery cases than the de minimis standard. The
substantial effects test ensures the proximity of the nexus between
the business and its interstate commerce dealings that the robbery
supposedly affected. This proximity ensures that the robbery
actually substantially affected interstate commerce-true to the
black letter of the Lopez ruling.129
Furthermore, the substantial effects test is better suited for
protecting federalism principles. This test creates a higher burden
for the federal government to prove how a robbery substantially
affected interstate commerce. By requiring a substantial
interference with commerce, great deference is given to the states'
general police powers, but it allows the federal government to
bring charges against those who have substantially affected
interstate commerce with their individual robbery. Thus,
federalism principles are protected and the government is free to
pursue a more select group of Hobbs Act offenders.

128. See Thomas, supra note 66, at 236 (stating that the framers believed
that this struggle between national and state power would ensure that the
states would have an interest in monitoring the activities of the federal
government to guarantee that the federal government was operating within
its enumerated authorities).
129. See Lopez, 555 F.3d at 558-59 (declaring that if the there is not
interference with an instrumentality or channel of interstate commerce, it
must be proven that the activity said to be affected had a substantial relation
to interstate commerce).

